This article has attempted to provide a framework for firms. to use in arranging their financing mix and choosing appropriate
financing vehicles. The problem has been broken down into three hugely separable objectives: minimizing after - tax financing costs, managing risk, and minimizing the agency costs caused by the incentives managers sometimes here to act in ways that harm
bondholders or stockholders.
The primary emphasis is on taking advantage of financing
choice that are "bargains" - that is, financing options priced at below - market rates. Bargains can result from the creative
packaging and marketing of claims issued by the firm. More likely, they wil1 be the result of distortions in capital markets due to tax
asymmetries or government intervention: either of these may
cause differences to exist in the risk - adjusted after - tax costs of different sources and types of funds.
Once the firm has taken advantage of any bargains available, it can then arrange additional financing in such a way as to reduce
operating risks resulting from economic or political factors. Finally this article shows how agency costs associated with the
separation of ownership and control can influence the choice of capital structure and the use of public versus private source of