@article { author = {}, title = {-}, journal = {Financial Research Journal}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {-}, year = {1994}, publisher = {University of Tehran}, issn = {1024-8153}, eissn = {2423-5377}, doi = {}, abstract = {This article has attempted to provide a framework for firms. to use in arranging their financing mix and choosing appropriate financing vehicles. The problem has been broken down into three hugely separable objectives: minimizing after - tax financing costs, managing risk, and minimizing the agency costs caused by the incentives managers sometimes here to act in ways that harm bondholders or stockholders. The primary emphasis is on taking advantage of financing choice that are "bargains" - that is, financing options priced at below - market rates. Bargains can result from the creative packaging and marketing of claims issued by the firm. More likely, they wil1 be the result of distortions in capital markets due to tax asymmetries or government intervention: either of these may cause differences to exist in the risk - adjusted after - tax costs of different sources and types of funds. Once the firm has taken advantage of any bargains available, it can then arrange additional financing in such a way as to reduce operating risks resulting from economic or political factors. Finally this article shows how agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control can influence the choice of capital structure and the use of public versus private source of funds}, keywords = {}, title_fa = {استراتژی تأمین مالی بلند مدت شرکتها}, abstract_fa = {}, keywords_fa = {}, url = {https://jfr.ut.ac.ir/article_14093.html}, eprint = {https://jfr.ut.ac.ir/article_14093_97e60cf5632008974f38940f577333df.pdf} }