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This article has attempted to provide a framework for firms. to use in arranging their financing mix and choosing appropriate financing vehicles. The problem has been broken down into three hugely separable objectives: minimizing after - tax financing costs, managing risk, and minimizing the agency costs caused by the incentives managers sometimes here to act in ways that harm bondholders or stockholders. The primary emphasis is on taking advantage of financing choice that are "bargains" - that is, financing options priced at below - market rates. Bargains can result from the creative packaging and marketing of claims issued by the firm. More likely, they wil1 be the result of distortions in capital markets due to tax asymmetries or government intervention: either of these may cause differences to exist in the risk - adjusted after - tax costs of different sources and types of funds. Once the firm has taken advantage of any bargains available, it can then arrange additional financing in such a way as to reduce operating risks resulting from economic or political factors. Finally this article shows how agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control can influence the choice of capital structure and the use of public versus private source of funds

The misconceptions fall into three distinct categories: 1- The nature of market efficiency 2- the evidence for efficiency 3- The implications of efficiency 1- The First group of misconceptions arises from a misunderstanding of what market efficiency signifies. If an efficient market is incorrectly interpreted as one which must necessarily be composed of all knowing and all seeing investors, who can penetrate the uncertainties of the future, Then it is understandable why misconceptions such as the following arise: 1-1- The market cannot always be right 1-2- EMH assumes that all investors behave rationally 1-3- Stock market bubbles imply inefficiency 2- It is natural for investors who are unfamiliar with the Research literature to attempt to rationalize their beliefs from their personal experience and this has been shown to offer ample scope for favoring the illusion of inefficiency. 3- If the nature of efficiency is misunderstood, then it is more likely that its implications will be incorrectly assessed

The purpose of this article is to test the efficiency of TSE. The semi - strong form of market efficiency was tested by answering two questions: 1- Has there been any abnormal rate of return on common stocks which were splitted? 2- If the answer to the first question is positive to what extent the stock split can be considered a determinant factor in stock price changes and whether other factors such as earnings or dividends are resposible for price changes. The result showed that TSE is not an efficient market and investors do not have enough information regarding the effect of stock splits or stock dividends. The results also showed that with the passage of time Iranian investors became more sophisticated and they no longer consider stock dividend as valuable as before. The study also demonstrated that consequent to stock dividend and stock split, no improvement in the profit of corporations was observed

jranslated_by:: farhad Abdollahzadeh The objective of this paper is to remind the readers of famous article by Fischer Black called "The Dividend Puzzle", which starts with "what should corporations do with their dividends?" We do not khow The capital structure puzzle is more complex than the dividend puzzle. Because we do not know why corporations issue many different securities. In this article two hypotheses were given: 1- Static tradeoff hypothesis and 2- Pecking order hypothesis. In static tradeoff hypothesis it is assumed that corporations have a tn_get debt ratio and try to move toward that ratio. In the packing order hypothesis it is assumed that the corporation will prefer internal financing to external financing and in case of external financing the corporation will prefer debt securities to common stock

Up to now no body has been able to present an optimal capital structure. The choice of capital structure should be based on tax saving, risk and cost of bankruptcy and asset type. For example, a safe, consistently profitable firm, with few intangible assets or growth opportumties ought to find a relatinely high debt ratio attractive. A risky growth company ought to avoid debt financing, especially if it faces other ways of shielding its income from taxes. Finaincing choices should also be based on issue costs, opportunities for subsidized financing and etc.

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